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ABSTRACT
We consider traffic-update mobile applications that let users
learn traffic conditions based on reports from other users.
These applications are becoming increasingly popular (e.g.,
Waze reported 30 million users in 2013) since they aggregate
real-time road traffic updates from actual users traveling on
the roads. However, the providers of these mobile services
have access to such sensitive information as timestamped
locations and movements of its users. In this paper, we de-
scribe Haze, a protocol for traffic-update applications that
supports the creation of traffic statistics from user reports
while protecting the privacy of the users. Haze relies on a
small subset of users to jointly aggregate encrypted speed
and alert data and report the result to the service provider.
We use jury-voting protocols based on threshold cryptosys-
tem and differential privacy techniques to hide user data
from anyone participating in the protocol while allowing only
aggregate information to be extracted and sent to the ser-
vice provider. We show that Haze is effective in practice
by developing a prototype implementation and performing
experiments on a real-world dataset of car trajectories.
1. INTRODUCTION
The interest in having access to our location based data has
been confirmed one more time in June of this year when
media articles reported that Google outbid Facebook to ac-
quire navigation startup Waze [30] for $1 billion.1 Waze is
a mobile application that provides real-time traffic data to
its users. This data comes from the users themselves, who
contribute fresh data by uploading their GPS coordinates.
Crowdsourcing navigation with 30 million users allows real
time updates and, hence, is very useful when picking a route
to avoid delays (see Figure 1).
User location data, however, contains very sensitive infor-
mation. Analyzing GPS travel data can reveal the location
1“Google Confirms Waze Maps App Purchase”in Wall Street
Journal, Jun 11 2013.
of an individual’s house and work, since there is a limited
number of possible routes that one can take [15]. Moreover,
since these data points are timestamped, one can also learn
home departure and arrival times, as well as trip duration
and purpose [22, 2]. In the case of Waze, user location data
can be joined with his Google account and potentially reveal
even more information. Moreover, court cases of unreported
tracking confirm that mobile users are not comfortable with
sharing their location data [18].
The challenge in preserving user privacy in services such as
Waze is due to the nature of their functionality. In order to
give quality service to its users, location data has to be col-
lected for aggregation and statistical processing. However,
we observe that precise user data is not required to pro-
vide traffic information such as current speed on the roads
or presence of congestions. Consider the traffic information
displayed by Waze and Google Maps in Figures 1 and 2,
respectively. It consists of color-coded road segments rep-
resenting traffic level, which is enough to plan routes effec-
tively. To report such statistics, the service provider only
needs to know if enough drivers are traveling at full speed,
or if a significant number of users has reported slight or se-
vere delays. Also, note that the maps display no data for
the less-traveled roads. Conveniently for this type of appli-
cation, areas which do not receive enough observations to
allow reliable statistics are typically not a source of travel
delays and can be safely ignored.
Motivated by the goal of providing privacy protection in
crowdsourced real-time traffic update services, we propose
a privacy-preserving version of such services, called Haze.
Given that the data used by the navigation mobile app is
already contributed by the drivers, we show that the aggre-
gation functionality also can be outsourced and distributed
among the users. Moreover, we develop a method that, al-
lows meaningful traffic statistics to be extracted even when
operating on user encrypted data.
Haze is a history-independent protocol that is invoked by
the service provider whenever she wishes to update the traf-
fic map. Figure 3 gives a high-level overview of the Haze
framework. The task of traffic map update is outsourced
to the users and is split in several phases: some users up-
load their data (users on the left in Figure 3), while others
aggregate this data (users, aka authorities, on the right),
and the final result is reported back to users by the service
provider. We reduce data upload to a voting protocol where
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Figure 1: Snapshot of Waze traffic update. The icon
with multiple cars shows traffic jam and the color of
the roads shows the traffic speed.
Figure 2: Snapshot of Google Maps traffic update.
As in Waze the color shows the traffic speed: high
(green), medium (yellow) and low (red).
instead of sending the exact data value, the user casts a vote
for an observation that fits his data, e.g., instead of sending
45mph as his current speed he votes for the range 40–50mph.
User vote is protected by encryption performed by the user
before the upload. Hence, neither the service provider nor
authorities have access to plain data of other users. Au-
thorities tally the encrypted votes for all observations and
report those that are deemed significant, i.e., enough users
have reported the same observation.
Haze also takes into account privacy leaks that data encryp-
tion cannot solve, as well some of the problems it introduces.
First, a potential privacy leak due to multiple runs of Haze
arises when a user is not present at all invocations, e.g., be-
cause the user reached his destination. The Haze protocol
guarantees differential privacy [13], i.e., it protects the pri-
vacy of each individual user by adding noise to the reported
statistics so that a user’s observation cannot significantly
change the traffic status. Secondly, submitting encrypted
data may encourage malicious users to report invalid data,
e.g., by submitting speed reports for multiple roads. Haze
prevents this behavior by enforcing users to prove the valid-
ity of their submitted observations. The dataflow of Haze is
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Figure 3: Haze overview: 1. Traffic data is uploaded
encrypted by the users. 2. Other users (authorities)
process encrypted data to extract aggregate statis-
tics. 3. The traffic statistics are published by the
service provider.
Charles	  Str	  
18mph	  
Encrypt	  
Aggregate	  
Sum	   Sum	  noise	  +	  
Sta9s9cs	  
Low	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  0	  
Med	  	  	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  0	  
High	  	  	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  0	  
Sum	  
noise	  >10?	  	  +	  
Figure 4: Data flow in Haze.
shown in Figure 4.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We describe a protocol for real-time privacy preserving
traffic data statistics. It can report most of the infor-
mation that a mobile app for traffic and road status
can, i.e., traffic flow, presence of congestions, accidents,
hazards, road work and gas stations.
• In contrast to previous work in this area [26, 23, 27,
28], we model gathering of traffic data as a voting pro-
tocol which allows us to hide the exact number of users
that have made a certain observation.
• We design a customized differentially private mecha-
nism which protects an individual user vote from chang-
ing the reported statistics by perturbing it. Previous
work on protecting location based data either consid-
ers a curator that has access to all the data in the
clear and adds noise to it [1, 16], or individual users
add noise to their data before encrypting and report-
ing it [27, 28]. The former approach is not applicable
in the distributed scenario, while the latter may accu-
mulate too much noise since clients do not coordinate
this phase. Our protocol enjoys the benefits of both
approaches: the noise addition is centralized while the
data comes encrypted and has distributed origin.
• Our protocol does not rely on a trusted third party
and pre-generated encryption keys while still offering
user privacy and protection against implausible user
data.
• We build a prototype of Haze and test its performance
on real-world dataset.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe
the model behind Haze in Section 2. The cryptographic
constructions used by Haze are overviewed in Section 3. In
Section 4, we present the Haze protocol. In Section 5, we
analyze the security properties of Haze. Work related to
Haze is discussed in Section 6. An experimental evaluation
of Haze is given in Section 7.
2. MODEL
2.1 Setting
Participants We refer to the provider of the traffic infor-
mation service as server and drivers that use this service,
e.g., by downloading an app, as a set of users. The subset of
users that participate in aggregation phase is referred to as
authorities. Data aggregation is more expensive than data
upload, hence, the role of an authority is assigned at random
every time the protocol is invoked.
Data Since the protocol is run on modern mobile services,
the application can easily determine the GPS coordinates
of a user. We assume that user speed can be automatically
determined by two timestamped GPS coordinates. Other
data such as traffic jam, accident, hazards, road closure, gas
station, or presence of a speed camera are manually entered
by a user. We also assume that roads and their partition
into segments by the server are publicly available and the
user can determine them from his GPS coordinates.
Communication The users, including the authorities, in-
teract with each other by sending messages to the server. We
assume the server will not drop messages since this would
result in non-accurate statistics and deteriorate her service.
2.2 Aggregated Statistics
Our method can report observations about road status such
as current speed, traffic jam, construction, presence of speed
cameras etc. As noted earlier, in order to report such data,
the service provider does not need to know how many users
have reported the presence of traffic jam, as long as she
knows that enough users have observed it. We model such
functionality as a voting procedure: users vote either 0 or
1 if they observed some event or not, the votes are then
tallied, and the event is reported only if there were enough
observations. For example, for speed reports we create sev-
eral non-overlapping speed ranges that users can vote for.
The set of all speed ranges is defined as C and the number
of ranges in C depends on the granularity of information the
service provider wants to report for the road segment i, e.g.,
C = {(0, 30), (30, 60), (60, 90) vs. C = {(0, 10), (10, 20), . . . ,
(80, 90)}. A user then votes for the speed range that corre-
sponds to his travel speed. To report the speed on segment i,
one can pick the range that at least Ti users have voted for.
Since several ranges in C may have more than Ti users, Ti
may need to be adjusted by the service provider. For traffic
jam reports C is simply a singular set {“traffic jam”}. A po-
tential concern for the case when |C| > 1 is that a malicious
user may vote more than once. In Section 4.3 we show how
to prevent users from such behavior.
2.3 Assumptions
We assume that users that upload their data are legitimate
users and have a certified signing public key that allows them
to sign their messages to the server. This allows anyone
downloading the message to verify that it came from a valid
user and has not been tampered with. We can relax this
assumption when deploying the protocol with applications
that support social network between its users. Since in this
model the users have already established trust with their
friends and family. For example, Waze allows users to sign
in with their Facebook account.
2.4 Attack Model and Security Properties
The server is malicious and is interested in learning as much
as possible about user data and, hence, cannot be trusted.
The server may also collude with users and at most half of
the authorities. The users are not trusted with their data
reports and may try to swing traffic status in their favor.
We guarantee the following properties in the honest but cu-
rious model: every participant behaves according to his pro-
tocol but is curious to learn more about other users’ data. In
the malicious case, the protocol can succeed and be secure
as long as at least half of the authorities are honest.
Server and Authority Obliviousness [28] The service provider
and the authorities should not learn anything about user
data beyond the aggregation information.
User Differential Privacy The user’s data is protected by
the differentially private mechanism that adds noise to the
statistics before it is released. In particular, the output of
the protocol in cases when the user uploads his data and not
are equally likely. This property is useful when the protocol
is run multiple times and the user does not participate in all
the runs.
User Accountability Since the users upload their data anony-
mously, they may maliciously add misleading information
such as being on several roads at the same time, or uploading
inconsistent data (e.g., several speed measurements). Our
protocol adds a verification step that allows to verify if the
user’s data is valid without learning what it actually is.
Fault Tolerance Haze can report statistics as long as at least
half of the users acting as authorities remain active during an
invocation. Every user that is not an authority can become
inactive as soon as he uploads the data. Moreover, we do
not require all legitimate users to participate in the protocol
every time it is invoked. The user may upload information
whenever he wishes to.
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
Haze relies on several cryptographic primitives that we briefly
overview in this section.
El Gamal Cryptosystem All user data is encrypted be-
fore it gets sent to the authorities via the server. We use
El Gamal cryptosystem [14] with public key PK, secret key
SK and parameters p and q where q is a large prime (2048
bits in our implementation) and p = 2qk + 1. The message
space is a subgroup Z∗p of order q. Encryption of message m
from this subgroup is denoted by encryptPK(ξ,m) where ξ
is picked randomly. Note that every message is encrypted
together with a random value ξ, hence, encrypting the same
message twice will very likely yield a new ciphertext. For
ease of notation, we write encryptPK(m), where the random
nonce ξ is implied. As we will see later, no participant
can make a call to function decryptSK(m). An important
property of El Gamal cryptosystem that we will take advan-
tage of is additive homomorphism: encryptPK(m1 + m2) =
encryptPK(m1) + encryptPK(m2). (Here, operator + is over-
loaded for simplicity since in reality ciphertexts are tuples
of two elements, which are multiplied correspondingly).
Threshold Cryptosystem Haze protects user data from
anyone participating in the protocol, hence, there is no par-
ticipant who can individually decrypt user data. To this end,
we use threshold El Gamal cryptosystem [25] where secret
key SK is split into shares between n participants, such that
no single participant is able to determine SK nor decrypt a
message encrypted under PK. Moreover, a ciphertext can be
decrypted as long as at least n/2 participants remain honest.
Distributed Key Generation is required to generate keys
for threshold cryptosystem. We use a distributed key gen-
eration protocol of [17], which succeeds if at least n/2 par-
ticipants execute the protocol correctly. The high-level idea
of this protocol is as follows: every participant k generates
n secret shares SKk,k′ and sends one to every other partic-
ipant k′. The secret share of participant k is the sum of
all shares received from other participants, i.e.,
∑
k′ SKk′,k.
The public key is the sum of masked own shares of every
participant k, i.e., sum of masked SKk,k. The actual proto-
col [17] is much more involved and takes into account partic-
ipants that generate inconsistent shares. Haze will require
only a subset of users A, aka authorities, to participate in
this protocol, and this subset can be different every time the
protocol is invoked.
Zero Knowledge Proof An important feature of Haze
is that all road observations and their aggregation is per-
formed on encrypted data. However, malicious users may
take advantage of this, e.g., by reporting several speed mea-
surements or reporting traffic jam at multiple locations. To
prevent submission of non-plausible data, users are required
to return a proof for every ciphertext they submit. Since
this proof should not reveal anything about the actual value
to the verifier, we use zero knowledge (ZK) proof with Fiat-
Shamir heuristic to make it non-interactive [8]. In Haze, we
are interested in verifying if the ciphertext submitted by the
user is an encryption of a message m that belongs to a set of
plausible values (e.g., {0, 1}) without revealing which one.
Equality Test To report the aggregate statistics we men-
tioned in Section 2.2, a set of users A will have to determine
whether the observations of the drivers are significant to be
reported or not. The significance of the results is determined
by the number of drivers that agree on an observation on
the same road. Hence, users in the set A will be required to
perform equality testing on encrypted values. To determine
whether e is an encryption of m, we will use the method
described in [20] which reduces the problem to determining
if a ciphertext is equal to 1. The method does not require
users to decrypt e but requires to generate a new set of keys
via Distributed Key Generation protocol.
MixNet One of the goals of Haze is to release useful statis-
tics about traffic status while revealing as little information
as possible. For example, a report of traffic jam on a partic-
ular road segment does not require the service provider to
know how many drivers have reported it, as long as she is
convinced that a reasonable number of drivers have. Hence,
we cannot run equality tests on the ciphertext e and known
threshold values. Instead, we require the set of users, aka
authorities, who run the equality test to create a permu-
tation of encrypted threshold values and run equality test
against this set (see below). We employ publicly verifiable
MixNet protocol to create such a permutation. A MixNet
protocol allows the authorities to encrypt and permute a set
of values, S, in a sequence and output the final permutation
of encrypted values of S, such that no one, including the
authorities, can trace the values of S to their location in the
output permutation. The protocol proceeds as follows. The
first authority trivially encrypts S as P0, i.e., this encryption
is not hiding and everyone can verify that P0 is an encryp-
tion of S. This authority then randomly reencrypts and per-
mutes P0 to get a permutation P1 and sends it to the next
authority. In general, the k-th authority participating in the
MixNet receives Pk−1, randomly reencrypts and permutes
it, and passes the resulting permutation, Pk, to the next au-
thority. The permutation produced by the last authority is
the output of the MixNet. The process does not require au-
thorities to decrypt the permutation that they receive. To
make sure that every authority performs the reencryption
and permutation faithfully, we use a method by [24], that
allows efficient verification of the mix without revealing the
underlying permutation.
As we will see later, Haze also uses MixNets to hide the noise
added to the reported statistics.
Inequality Test We perform operation InequalityTest to
learn if an encrypted tally e of those who voted for some ob-
servation is above a threshold T or not. We use the method
of [20] to determine the result of a comparison operation
without decrypting e. Instead of computing decryptSK(e) ≥
T , the authorities compute the result of
T−1∨
p=0
(
decryptSK(e)
?
= p
)
. (1)
The above equation can be easily computed by invoking the
equality test T times. However, we cannot run this pro-
cedure sequentially for values {0, . . . , T − 1}, since this re-
veals exact count when the number of users is below T . In-
stead, authorities engage in the MixNet protocol on the set
{0, . . . , T − 1}. The equality tests are then done against a
permutation of encrypted values of 0 to T − 1. If expres-
sion 1 returns 0, then decryptSK(e) is above the threshold,
and InequalityTest returns true.
Differential Privacy [11, 13] is used to preserve privacy
of an individual in statistical databases. This notion is cap-
tured by the following constraint: Let X and X ′ be two
databases which differ only in one record, then a mechanism
g is (, δ)-differentially private if ∀S ⊆ Output(g)
Pr[g(X) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[g(X ′) ∈ S] + δ
In other words, an output of g will be as likely in the presence
of an individual record, as in its absence.
4. HAZE PROTOCOL
First, we outline the Haze protocol in the idealized case when
a trusted third party (TTP) is available to assist in the exe-
cution of the protocol by playing the role of an intermediary
between the users and the service provider.
Every time a user wishes to report a traffic observation (e.g.,
the current user’s speed on a given road segment), the user
simply sends it to the TTP. The TTP aggregates the re-
ceived observations into traffic reports (e.g., a report could
state that the average speed on a given road segment is be-
tween 40 and 50 mph) and adds noise to the reported value
to protect the privacy of the users when they are leaving
or joining the protocol. Once the number of observations
generating a report is above a certain threshold, the TTP
transmits the report to the service provide. Note that in this
scenario, the server does not see the association between the
traffic reports forwarded by the TTP and the users who gen-
erated them. Also, the traffic reports received by the TTP
have values that incorporate noise.
Since a protocol that employs a TTP is rather unrealistic,
Haze does not assume the existence of a TTP. Instead, Haze
simulates a TTP by means of a distributed protocol that
splits the operations of the TTP among the server and a
subset of the users, called authorities. We will show that we
can guarantee the security properties stated in Section 2.4
as long as at least half of the authorities execute the protocol
correctly.
4.1 Outline
The Haze protocol is invoked every time the service provider
wishes to report statistics about a certain event, e.g., average
speed on a set of roads or presence of construction work. The
protocol consists of three phases: Setup, Data Upload, and
Aggregation.
The service provider, aka the server, is involved in every
phase of the protocol while users are engaged in two of the
three phases depending on their role. In particular, a user
can either contribute to the protocol by providing his traffic
observation or by assisting in the privacy-preserving aggre-
gation of the data provided by other users. We refer to the
users who perform aggregations as authorities.
During the Setup phase, the authorities establish encryp-
tion keys to allow users to encrypt and hide their observa-
tions. The server also specifies the set of plausible candi-
date observations for this event, e.g., C = {“traffic jam”}
or C = {(0, 30), (30, 60), (60, 90)}. Next, the users partici-
pate in the Upload phase, by sending encrypted data to the
server. The transmitted data record consists of the votes
by the user for the candidate observations, where the vote
is either 0 or 1 depending on whether the user has actually
made this observation or not. For example, for speed ranges
above the user would vote {1, 0, 0} if his speed is 18mph.
Note that authorities also can participate in this phase. Fi-
nally, during the Result Computation phase, the authorities
operate on encrypted user data to report data of the event in
question. In this phase, the authorities tally user votes, add
noise to preserve the privacy of individual votes, and notify
the server of observations that were reported by a significant
number of users.
Haze is history independent and does not rely on a fixed
set of participating users (and, hence, authorities). Thus,
the role of a user is established during the setup phase of a
single invocation of Haze and can change the next time the
protocol is run. More importantly, the encryption keys that
are created during the setup phase are used only once.
In the rest of this section, we describe the three phases of
the Haze protocol.
The notation used is summarized in Table 1.
4.2 Setup
The server sets up the protocol by specifying a type of
traffic for which she wishes to collect statistics. She then
picks a set C of possible categories of values for this event.
For example, to collect statistics on vehicle speed, the
server can pick the following set of speed ranges: C =
{(0, 10), (10, 30), (30, 50), (50,∞)}. Let C denote the size of
set C. A user reports an observation by casting a ballot V ,
which is a C-tuple of binary votes on the observation cate-
gories for the event. In the above example, let c denote the
speed range (30, 50). A user going at speed 40mph will set
V [c] = 1 and V [d] = 0 for any other speed range d ∈ C − c.
The server also picks N road segments for which she is inter-
ested in traffic statistics. For each road segment i, she sets
a minimum threshold Ti on the number of users that report
an observation for the statistics to be deemed significant.
The protocol relies on a set of users, A, called authorities,
to perform aggregation on user data in a privacy-preserving
manner. The authorities are picked at random to reduce the
Table 1: Notation for the Haze protocol, referring
to the speed statistics example.
N number of road segments
M number of users
r(j), s(j) road segment and value observed by user j
C, C = |C| set of observation categories and its size
Ti minimum number of users for receiving
speed statistics on the ith road segment
Vj [i][c] vote by user j on observation category c
for road segment i
PK, SK public key and secret key for El Gamal
cryptosystem
A, A = |A| set of authorities and its size
N array of noises for the differentially-private
mechanism
chance of selecting users that may collude with the server.
A user may flip a coin and decide if he is an authority or not.
However, he may lie about the outcome of his coin. To make
this process publicly verifiable, we propose that users extract
randomness from a publicly verifiable random source, such
as temperature at an airport or stock-index price.
Once the set of users who serve as authorities is identified,
the authorities run the distributed key generation protocol
from Section 3. By the end of this protocol, the public key,
denoted PK, is announced and every authority, k, has a share
of the encryption secret key, denoted SKk. By using the
threshold encryption scheme, A/2 authorities are enough to
decrypt the data, where A = |A|. This approach allows
Haze to be fault tolerant in case A/2 − 1 authorities lose
connectivity, and, at the same time, allows to defend against
a coalition of at most A/2−1 malicious authorities who may
want to try to decrypt data of individual users.
4.3 Data Upload
The data upload phase is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Voting We recall that a user casts a ballot, V , to indicate
his observation. The C components of the ballot correspond
to the categories for the observation. Thus, the user should
vote 1 for only one category and 0 for the rest. Let r(j) be
the road segment that user j is traveling on and let s(j) be
his observation (e.g., s(j) = 40). Instead of sending value
s(j), the user casts vote 1 for the component of the ballot
associated with the category c that includes value s(j), that
is, the user sets V [c] = 1 for category c such that s(j) ∈ c
(e.g., c denotes the speed range (30, 50)). Since all the com-
munication between the users is done via the server, user j
encrypts the votes in the ballot by using the public key PK,
which had been generated by the authorities in the previous
step (setup). We recall that we use a randomized encryption
method. Thus, any two votes are computationally indistin-
guishable.
Suppose a user is in road segment i. To hide his location,
the user casts a fictitious ballots for all other road segments
in the system besides its real ballot for road segment i. Note
that fictitious ballots should have all components set to 0.
Thus, each user submits N ballots with C votes each.
Proving Valid Votes Since votes are encrypted and no
participant learns the votes of other participants, a mali-
cious user may upload invalid data. For example he could
cast vote 2 (instead of 0 or 1), or vote for all road segments
in his neighborhood to create the appearance of traffic and
discourage other users from driving there. To detect mali-
cious behavior, we require every user to also submit a non-
interactive zero knowledge proof (Section 3) of the integrity
of his votes. In particular, each user has to give a proof
that in his ballot, at most one vote is 1 and the remaining
votes are 0. Recall that an NIZK proof allows one to verify
a property of a data set without learning the data set itself.
Overall, for every road i, a user j submits ballot Vj [i] of C
encrypted votes. Also, user j submits an NIZK proof Πj of
the validity of the ballots. Namely, Πj proves that across all
ballots submitted by user j, every vote is either 0 or 1, and
there is at most one vote equal to 1.
Algorithm 1 Protocol executed by user j in the data upload
phase (Section 4.3)
input: r(j): current road segment of user j; s(j): value
observed by user j on road segment r(j);.
output: for each road segment i, ballot Vj [i] cast by
user j on road segment i, consisting of C encrypted votes
Vj [i][c] on every observation category c; and Πj : an NIZK
proof of the integrity of the N ballots cast by user j
for all road segments i ∈ {1, . . . , N} do
for all speed categories c ∈ C do
{ Vote 1 for the real observation and 0 for the rest}
if r(j) = i AND s(j) ∈ c then
Vj [i][c]← encryptPK(1)
else
Vj [i][c]← encryptPK(0)
end if
end for
Πj [i]← NIZK PROOF(V [i])
Send ballot Vj [i] to server
end for
Send proof Πj of the validity of the ballots to server
4.4 Aggregation
The aggregation phase begins after the server receives and
forwards to the authorities the encrypted ballots (Vj) and
proofs of integrity (Πj). We assume that the server will
forward all data received since she is interested in providing
informative service to her users and stay competitive with
similar applications. The aggregation phase is outlined in
Algorithm 2.
Data Verification and Aggregation Every authority ver-
ifies the integrity of the users’ votes by running a non-
interactive zero-knowledge verification protocol on the en-
crypted ballot Vj of every user j, using proof Πj . Once all
the votes are verified, every authority tallies the votes for ev-
ery road segment and category into an array E. Note that E
contains encrypted sum of votes since the underlying crypto
system allows addition of encrypted values.
Differential Privacy We wish to protect every user from
an adversary who is trying to trace the user between sev-
eral runs of Haze. Since a user leaving the protocol may
lead to changes in the traffic results reported for the road
he was traveling on, and in turn reveal to the adversary the
information we are trying to hide. We wish to protect such
attacks by adding a noise to the statistics before releasing
them to the service provider. In particular, we wish to make
the output of the protocol differentially private: should be
bounded. When adding noise we need to decide on the dis-
tribution of noise, how to pick values from this distribution,
and at the same time hide which value was picked.
We define a special noise distribution as follows. Recall
that given a vector of 0/1 votes P = [p1, . . . , pM ] we wish
to compute a function f(P, T ) = 0, if
∑
P [i] < T , and
f(P, T ) = 1, otherwise. We design a customized mech-
anism g by picking q uniformly from a set of size 1/δ:
N = {q | − b1/2δc < q ≤ b1/2δc}, and setting g(P, T ) = 0,
if
∑
P [i] + q < T , and g(P, T ) = 1, otherwise. In Section 5
we show that g is differentially private.
Algorithm 2 Protocol executed by authority k in the ag-
gregation phase (Section 4.4).
Step 1. Verify and aggregate encrypted ballots
input: encrypted ballots and their proofs for all the users,
i.e., pairs (Vj ,Πj) for j = 1 . . .M
output: encrypted tally of the valid votes for every road
segment and category, represented by a C-dimensional ar-
ray E of size N
{Check the votes}
for all users j do
if verifyProof(Vi,Πi) = false then
remove j from the set of users
end if
end for
{Aggregate votes for each road segment and category}
for all road segments i and categories c do
E[i][c]←∑j Vj [i][c]
end for
Step 2. Generate noise
input: Set of noises N { for differential privacy }
output: for all road segments i, and observation cate-
gories, c ∈ C, permutation PAi,c of N
for all road segments i and categories c do
Participate in MixNet protocol for N to generate PAi,c
end for
Step 3. Add noise
{Add noise from the last permutation sequence to the
encrypted tallied values}
for all road segments i and categories c do
E′[i][c]← E[i][c] + PAi,c[1]
end for
Step 4. Report the statistics
for all road segments i ∈ {1, . . . , N} do
for all observation categories c ∈ C do
if InequalityTest(E′[i][c], Ti) = true then
Report (i, c) {c was picked by at least Ti users}
end if
end for
end for
To simulate the behavior of g, the authorities create a per-
mutation of the encrypted N by invoking the MixNet pro-
tocol from Section 3. The first encrypted noise of the last
permutation is then added to the final result. As long as
at least half of the authorities execute MixNet correctly, no
authority can track noise values in N to values in the final
permutation PA. Each released statistics should be treated
independently when adding noise from N . Hence, the au-
thorities mix a total N × C noise arrays of size |N |.
Statistics Extraction Let E′ be an array of tallied en-
crypted values with added noise for every road segment and
observation. To extract information from E′, the author-
ities need to determine if the event has been observed by
a significant number of users. In particular, for every road
segment i and observation category c, the authorities need
to check if at least Ti users voted for c on the ith segment,
i.e., if decryptSK(E
′[i][c]) ≥ Ti. Recall that we do not allow
anyone participating in the protocol, including authorities,
to learn the exact number of users who reported statistics
for individual road segments. Hence, the authorities are not
allowed to decrypt E′. Even if an authority is malicious, he
cannot decrypt E′ unless other A/2−2 authorities are mali-
cious as well. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier comparison
over encrypted data is not trivial and expensive.
We use the Inequality Test ( Section 3) for each value
E′[i][c] and threshold Ti. Observations for which the test
returns true (i.e., the number of users who voted for this ob-
servation exceeds the threshold) are reported to the server.
Note that the users who are not authorities do not partic-
ipate during this phase, and can go offline as soon as they
upload their data. Also, users are not required to partici-
pate in every data upload and, hence, the protocol is tolerant
against any number of users going offline.
4.5 Extensions
Data upload requires each user to encrypt and send N ×
C messages when El Gamal encryption is used. One can
improve the complexity to N + C if the BGN [3] scheme is
used; this scheme is also additively homomorphic but allows
one multiplication operation on the ciphertexts.
Since users may be crossing multiple road segments when
uploading the data, our protocol can be easily extended to
multiple-segment voting. In this case, the ballot-validity
proof should include a proof that the user did not vote for
more than the allowed number of segments.
5. SECURITY
In this section, we show that Haze provides several formal
privacy guarantees. We begin by proving that the noise
addition step yields differential privacy.
Theorem 1. Let P be a vector of 0/1 votes P =
[p1, . . . , pM ] and q be a value picked uniformly at random
from set N = {−b1/2δc + 1, . . . , b1/2δc}. Define mecha-
nism g as g(P, T ) = 0, if
∑
P [i] + q < T , and g(P, T ) = 1,
otherwise. We have that g is (0, δ) differentially private.
Proof. We show that for each x ∈ Output(g), we have
Pr[g(P, T ) = x] ≤ exp() Pr[g(P ′, T ) = x] + δ : (2)
where P and P ′ differ in one location, i.e., either
∑
P [i] =∑
P ′[i] + 1 or
∑
P [i] =
∑
P ′[i]− 1.
We consider the case when x = 1 (the case for x = 0 is
symmetrical) and expand Inequality 2:
Pr[g(P, T ) = 1]− Pr[g(P ′, T ) = 1] = (3)
Pr[
∑
P [i] + q ≥ T ]− Pr[
∑
P ′[i] + q ≥ T ] (4)
Note that whenever
∑
P [i] =
∑
P ′[i] − 1, Pr[∑P [i] + q ≥
T ] ≤ Pr[∑P ′[i] + q ≥ T ] and the expression in Equation 4
is always less than δ. Hence, we consider the case when∑
P [i] =
∑
P ′[i] + 1 in Equation 4:
Pr[
∑
P [i] + q ≥ T ]− Pr[
∑
P [i]− 1 + q ≥ T ] =
|N | − T +∑P [i]
|N | −
|N | − T +∑P [i]− 1
|N | = δ
Haze protects individual user privacy even when the service
provider colludes with authorities and users, i.e., the proto-
col is server and authority oblivious (see Section 2.4).
Theorem 2. Haze is server oblivious and authority obliv-
ious if less than half of of authorities collude with the server.
Proof. (Sketch) The privacy of user votes for an individ-
ual segment and observation pair follows from the security
of a single observation (ballot) in the jury voting protocol
in [20]. We can extend the analysis to multiple segments
and observations since the only inference that the adver-
sary can make from seeing previous observation results, is
the number of users who can potentially vote for the rest
of the ballots. This again reduces to the proof for a sin-
gle observation where the number of users participating in
voting is known, i.e., as it is in [20]. The proof depends on
the correct execution of underlying cryptographic primitives
used in the protocol, i.e., Distributed Key Generation and
MixNet, which operate correctly as long as at least half of
the authorities are not malicious. If the adversary colludes
with a subset of users, i.e., she knows their votes, then she
can learn if the remaining honest users voted above or below
the threshold, but cannot infer the individual votes.
6. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss work related to Haze. We begin
by discussing systems with goals similar to those of Haze.
Table 2 gives a comparison of Haze with these systems.
Private Aggregation of Distributed Data Preserving
the privacy of distributed spatiotemporal data during ag-
gregation by an untrusted party has been studied in [4, 26,
23, 27, 28, 5]. PrivStats [26] provides a scheme where mobile
users report encrypted position data to location-based ap-
plications that aggregate and report statistics on this data.
PrivStats preserves the privacy of the user’s location and al-
lows the application to verify that users have provided valid
data. The method uses a smoothing module that adds fic-
titious records and noise to the data. Also, the smoothing
module has a secret key to the encryption scheme and is re-
sponsible for decrypting server-aggregated statistics. This
module is installed on cars and is fully trusted. Hence,
PrivStats’s trust model is very different from ours.
The system by Carbunar et al. [5] collects aggregated lo-
cation based statistics via a voting protocol. It relies on a
trusted anonymizer between users and parties interested in
aggregated results (called venues). Instead, Haze does not
rely on a trusted third party. Also, unlike Haze, this method
does not provide differential privacy guarantees. The model
is also different from ours as it involves 3 parties: users,
social network providers and venues. The user receives his
encryption key from the provider and sends encrypted data
to the venue, proving vote validity to him. Haze does not
rely on receiving keys from a service provider; instead, the
Table 2: Comparing Haze with previous work.
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authorities run a distributed key-generation protocol. Haze
also differs in the type of statistics it provides: it reports
whether a vote count is higher or lower than some thresh-
old, but never the exact number of users. Instead, in [5], the
number of users is revealed, since the adversary can decrypt
the tally only if exactly k users have casted their votes.
The protocols described in [23, 27, 28] preserve distributed
data aggregation by requiring each user or node to add
differentially-private noise to their data before reporting it.
Monreale et al. [23] describe a differentially-private mech-
anism that allows every node to report a trajectory of its
moves, while preserving privacy of the individual moves.
However, perturbing the reported trajectory does not hide
the link between the user and his data. Even though the
server does not know precisely when the nodes moved from
one location to another, she learns the trend of the node
behavior. On the other hand, in the framework of Rastogi
and Nath [27] and that of Shi et al. [28], the server never
sees user data in the clear. In their schemes, every user adds
noise to his data, encrypts it using additively homomorphic
encryption with his share of secret key, and sends it to the
server, who then aggregates received data. To be able to
decrypt the aggregated result, in [27], the server sends the
aggregated value back to every user for decryption and then
joins the partial decryptions to get the final result. The
method of [28] also uses an encryption scheme that allows
an aggregated value to be decrypted only if every user has
contributed his data. Chan et al. [6] show how to make
these methods fault tolerant by requiring every user to sub-
mit their data logarithmic number of times. Both methods
are described in the scenario where all users are observing
the data that can be aggregated into a single result, e.g.,
sum over data points of the same type. It becomes tricky
to adapt these methods to traffic statistics that we consider
here. In our scenario different users may provide observa-
tions for different roads, and, hence, every road has its own
aggregated result. A naive extension to [27] and [28] would
allow the server to link the users and the roads they are
on. It is also worth noting that in Haze, we apply differen-
tially private mechanism to aggregated result, while in [27,
28], users independently apply noise before submitting their
data. Since this is a distributed mechanism, the noise vari-
ance may reduce the utility of the aggregated result.
Sepia [4] describes a framework for private monitoring of
network traffic for multiple events. Their approach is sim-
ilar to ours in the sense that the system also consists of
input peers, who deliver their data encrypted, and privacy
peers (called authorities in our protocol), who perform ag-
gregation of this data. Although the setup is similar, the
execution of data collection and aggregation is very differ-
ent from that of Haze. In order to aggregate statistics across
events, privacy peers need to group encrypted data by their
event id. To this end, privacy peers engage in distributed
equality protocol for every submitted encrypted user data.
Once aggregated the peers engage in distributed comparison
protocol. Haze achieves similar functionality by using vot-
ing and mix-net protocols. Additionally, statistics reported
by Haze are differential private.
Next, we overview work on the related areas of differential
privacy, private location-based queries, and jury voting.
Differential Privacy Differential privacy was formulated
in [13] and a survey of further results is presented in [11].
Differential privacy of statistical databases protects privacy
of an individual by adding noise to the released data. Noisy
data adds uncertainly on whether the data of an individual
is present in the database or not. A common scenario is
to assume a presence of a curator who has access to all the
data and adds noise before releasing it, or adds noise to
query results when operating in an interactive mode.
Differentially-private mechanisms have been proposed to re-
port the trajectory of moving objects [1], raw time-series
traffic data [16] and spatial data decomposition [7]. How-
ever, these methods assume a trusted party that has access
to already collected data and is responsible for perturbing
it before publishing. This differs significantly from our work
where data is distributed and there is no trusted third party
to aggregate and anonymize the data. Differential privacy
was also considered in the distributed scenario in [12]. How-
ever, in this work all users have to engage in a distributed
noise generation protocol before releasing individual data.
Private Location Based Queries Location based privacy
has been considered also from the view point of a single user
who is making queries based on his location and wishes to re-
ceive such information without revealing his location [21, 9,
19]. This work can be split into k-anonymization techniques
where user’s identity cannot be distinguished from other k-1
users, and cloaking techniques, where a larger region is sent
during the query instead of precise user location.
Jury Voting The jury voting protocol by Hevia and
Kiwi [20] allows participants to determine whether a vote
tally is above a threshold or not. Haze extends the par-
ticipant model and cryptographic primitives of [8] and [20],
to accommodate a more complicated ballot structure and
guarantee differential privacy of individual votes.
7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have developed a full prototype implementation of
Haze based on several primitives implemented in the Civ-
itas [10] voting system, including distributed key gener-
ation, El Gamal cryptosytem, distributed exponentiation
(used in equality testing), and interface to GNU GMP (a
multiple-precision arithmetic library). The Haze prototype
includes the efficient verification of a mix-protocol from [24],
an extension of the NIZK ballot validity protocol to sup-
port voting for more than one segment, our differentially-
private algorithm, and the reporting of statistics for multi-
ple roads. The experiments were conducted on a 32 core
2.6GHz Opteron 6282 SE with 64GB RAM running 64bit
Debian Wheezy. For the El Gamal cryptosystem, we used a
2048 bit key and message space of 160 bits. The noninter-
active ZK proofs use the SHA-256 function. The timing of
the experiments was averaged across 10 runs. We used data
from TAPAS Cologne Project [29]. This dataset contains
actual GPS coordinates and speeds of drivers in the city of
Cologne, as measured during a 6am–8am time period.
The reported statistics are perturbed by noise depending
on parameter δ. In Table 3, we show how the value of δ
influences the accuracy of the results in terms of precision
and recall measurements. The results are taken from 1, 000
data points, during one minute, where 4, 000 users had to
pick among 3 speed ranges on one road segment, and the
threshold on the number of users was set to T = 11. As
expected, the accuracy of the results degrades with lower
values of δ.
We optimize the equality test in the results aggregation step
by requiring all users to participate in mixing {0, . . . , Ti−1}
sets for tuples (i, c) (Algorithm 2). Thus, the task is dis-
tributed over all M participants and not just the author-
ity set. In Table 4, we measure the total time to run the
protocol for different number of users but fixed number of
authorities. The reported time is a lapse of time from the
start of setup protocol till the authorities output result for
every road. Since user can upload his data in parallel and
authorities can run the MixNet, ballot verification indepen-
dently, we allowed one core per protocol participant (the
time for 100 participants is estimated from the total time of
the sequential execution). It is interesting to note that our
protocol takes advantage as the number of users grows since
MixNet jobs can be distributed over a larger set.
In Figure 5, we show the split of the total time across differ-
ent steps in the protocol for 30 users and 5 or 10 authorities.
As expected, the most expensive part of the protocol is the
MixNet verification. We also vary the number of observa-
tion categories that users can vote for: a single category in
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) (e.g., whether road work has been ob-
served) and 3 categories (e.g., low/mid/high speed ranges)
in Figures 5(c) and 5(d). The running time of the protocol
increases with the number of observation categories.
Table 3: Precision and recall values for observations
reported by Haze differentially-private mechanism
during a period of 60 seconds.
δ 0.5 0.3 0.1
Precision 97% 98% 86%
Recall 100% 98% 88%
Table 4: Total time to run Haze for N = 100 roads,
C = 3, δ = 1/3, |A| = 10 and T = 10 for all roads.
Number of Users (M) 20 25 30 100
Total Protocol Time (secs) 351 314 274 40
(a) M = 30, |A| = 10, |C| = 1 (b) M = 30, |A| = 5, |C| = 1
(c) M = 30, |A| = 10, |C| = 3 (d) M = 30, |A| = 5, |C| = 3
Figure 5: Breakdown of the running time of the
Haze protocol by step.
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